In addition to these political considerations, Europe's postwar economic situation played an equally significant role. As a result of the destructive effects of World War II, the pattern of international trade had undergone pronounced changes, especially in Europe. 8 The urgent need for re-equipping its industries as well as the effects of the Iron Curtain's cutting Europe off from its former sources of raw materials and food," were bound to lead to unusually large imports from the United States. 10 The net excess of imports over exports and the loss of its foreign assets only intensified Europe's long standing trade deficit with the United States and further aggravated the dollar shortage." Europe's surpassing of pre-war production levels 12 must not, in view of its increased population and United States financial assistance, be considered a sign of healthy recovery. 13 These difficulties of international trade, together with European efforts to maintain full employment by protecting domestic industry and labor, have resulted in a rigid pattern of intra-European trade. Bilateral trade agreements, with their inherent tendency toward autarchy, have restrained the free movement of goods, services, and capital.
14 Such an economic policy protected weak domestic industry and, by limiting the size of the market, precluded efficient mass production.' 3 By disregarding the principle of comparative advantage, 16 protectionism maintained high production costs and prices. Europe's high production costs were largely the result of international double pricing of raw materials.'
7
For example, against a domestic price for Lor-S. Eco STEEL TR.NDs 39, 66. E.g., it is estimated that the cost of raw material is responsible for up to S0% of the price of pig iron, and 75% of the price of crude steel. For raine ore of 585 francs per ton, France charged an export price of no less than 1,080 francs. German metallurgical coke was similarly double priced: a domestic price of $12.60 per ton against an export price of $17.50. 18 The crippling effects of double pricing were further intensified by discriminatory railroad freight rates, 19 which, in view of the bulk of raw materials needed for steel production, 20 considerably increased the price of steel. High steel prices may choke any stimulus for increased demand and restrict the volume of production and employment. They also handicap Europe's ability to compete successfully with American products on the world market, and further frustrate attempts to alleviate the existing dollar deficit. The nature and magnitude of post-war Europe's political and economic problems necessitated new practices and institutions.
2 2 Hence the Schuman Plan came into existence, encompassing coal and steel, the backbones of a modern economy. These industries require some degree of control because they have difficulties in adjusting to changes in consumption, and are the first industries affected by cyclical fluctuations in an economic system. 178-201 (1947) .
DAUGHERTY, DE CHAZEAU & STRATTO, THE ECONOMICS OF THE IRON AND STL INDUSTRY 5, 32 (1937).
24. TREATY Art. 79, 1f 1 explicitly refers to European territories only. This excludes the metropolitan area of French Algeria with its rich iron ore deposits which are of particular importance to the Italian steel industry. RAPPORT [Vol. 63 :1 "(a) import and export duties, or charges with an equivalent effect, and quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel; "(b) measures or practices discriminating among producers, among buyers or among consumers, specifically as concerns prices, delivery terms and transportation rates, as well as measures and practices which hamper the buyer in the free choice of his supplier; "(c) subsidies or state assistance, or special charges imposed by the State, in any form whatsoever; "(d) restrictive practices tending toward the division of markets or the exploitation of the consumer."
20
By creating a common productive unit and market for coal and steel$ 0 the participating States have pooled resources representing fifteen percent of their industrial production and constituting two-thirds of the world's steel exports.
2 7 A dense railroad network, a cheap waterway transportation system, and skilled manpower, all contribute substantially to the economic efficiency of this "most powerful industrial basin in the world which history has divided." 2 ' The proximity of the main production centers to the domestic market, and to exporting harbors, rounds out the Community's favorable economic conditions. Many benefits are expected from an enlarged, common market with no trade barriers. An expanded market is suitable for mass production techniques, which are particularly important in the steel industry 2 -0 with its necessary concentration of production in large units requiring heavy capital investments 00 Moreover, labor, natural resources, and capital are more productively utilized in a common market, thus reducing, through specialization, modernization, and expansion, the production costs of basic steel products.3' Free from discriminatory trade practices, the common market should facilitate movement of essential raw materials and result in cheaper procurement 2 The long range benefits of the common market are increased consumption and 25. Id. Art. 4. The common market has been in force for coal and iron ore since Feb. 26. An excellent map of the European coal and steel industries is attached to EurOPnEAx SaE TRENDs. For tables on the main iron ore deposits and coal reserves, see Appndi-: III, id. at 115-116.
10, 1953. HIGH AUTHORY, THE

HIGH AUTHORITY, REP. ON THE SITUATION OF THE COnUNITY 58 (1953).
Ibid.
29. EuRoPEAx S=r. TRxDs 40,61-3. 30. In 1949, the cost of building a modem integrated steel mill with an annual crude steel capacity of one million tons was estimated at about 200 to 300 million dollars; in the United States the figures quoted ran from 300 to 400 million dollars. Id net consumer purchasing power, and thus an improved Community standard of living." But these expected benefits depend upon the condition of the steel market. The steel industry plays a key role in the structure of any modern economy, A decrease in the steel production caused by reduced steel consumption or shortage of essential raw materials, is bound to cause unemployment not only in steel mills but in steel consuming and transportation industries as well. 4 Consequently, the Plan seeks to meet and forestall situations likely to endanger the steel industry. The Community assures this industry regular supplies of iron, coal, and coke, 3 5 if need be, by allocation. 36 Furthermore, by offering coal miners and steel workers higher wages, improved working and living conditions, and assistance against the hazard of unemployment, 7 the Community hopes to maintain an efficient and qualified labor force. Finally, regttlar surveys of market conditions 38 and regulation of the flow of investment "I should enable the Community to utilize fully the production capacity of the steel industry.
40
The Member States' competitive positions in world trade are also expected to improve. High production and lower prices of steel and capital goods will permit increased exports either to dollar countries or to non-dollar areas able to offer in exchange their agricultural products or raw materials. 41 In either instance, such increased exports will result in dollar savings, help to cure the dollar imbalance, and restore Europe's viability in world trade.
Competitive Market: The common market, established by the removal of national trade barriers and discriminatory restrictions on coal and steel movement, could not alone assure the benefits of competition. The coal and steel 33. For the complex roles of consumption and net consumer purchasing power in affect- [Vol. 63:1 industries could continue to fix prices, restrict production and technology, and allocate markets and raw materials. The Treaty seeks, therefore, to organize and maintain a competitive as well as common market, free from any restrictive or monopolistic practices;43 to that end, it provides strong anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions designed to prevent any abuse of the competitive system. These provisions, directly enforceable within the Community, represent the first instance of supranational legislation replacing the Member State's anti-cartel and deconcentration laws in the field of coal and steel."
The anti-cartel provisions of Article 65 of the Treaty do not preclude nonrestrictive and non-discriminatory arrangements which further specialization of production, or facilitate joint selling or buying. The Community, however, must explicitly authorize these arrangements as essential, and capable of improving production or marketing. the parties, the Treaty judges these restrictive practices in terms of their potential danger to, and effects upon, competition within the market, especially with regard to prices, restrictions on production or technology, division of markets and allocation of raw materials. 49 Since these anti-cartel provisions are applicable to business practices of the coal, steel, and distributing enterprises within the Community, the way is left open for export cartels. 50 This seems to be a serious shortcoming of Article 65; particularly so, if one refers to the experience with the Webb-Pomerene Act, 51 designed to strengthen the export potential of United States industry.
This Act became in fact a convenient vehicle for introducing through the back door the effects of cartel practices on the domestic market.
5 2 It is questionable whether the Community will tolerate a similar development.
3 Certainly, the Community is not entirely deprived of means to prevent it. It should be noted that Article 65 makes no distinction between agreements of coal and steel enterprises tending to introduce restrictive business practices within the Community or outside of it. Article 65 only views such agreements in the light of restrictive effects likely to occur within the Community. Thus, a restrictive agreement between two or more coal or steel enterprises forming an export cartel would be void and the enterprises subject to sanctions if such an agreement would have repercussions which might "indirectly" restrict competition within the Community's market. involving at least one coal or steel enterprise, or distributors thereof, which might lead to economic concentration by merger, sales of securities or assets, loans, or "any other means of control."
' ;" The Community will forbid any transaction submitted for approval and declare illegal any economic concentrations already attained if they would or do "impair the maintenance of effective competition" in the coal or steel market within the Community.
The Community's control over economic concentration is broader than that over restrictive business practices. Article 66 reaches third parties outside coal and steel, 5 7 as, for example, a German shipyard which merges with a French steel mill, or a German chemical enterprise which gains control over Ruhr coal mines. The Community's deconcentration power is also applicable to a foreign national conducting his business from abroad, if his transaction impairs, by concentration within the Community, effective competition in coal or steel. Thus an American corporation which owns a Belgian rolling mill would be subject to possible deconcentration if it acquires from a Swiss bank a substantial control over a Luxemburg steel mill. Although the anti-cartel provisions under Article 65 cannot be invoked unless two or more coal or steel enterprises are involved, the deconcentration measures of Article 66 may apply to transactions involving two enterprises within the Community, only one of which need be in coal or steel.
Without resorting to control over other firms, a single coal or steel enterprise may expand and acquire a dominant position in the common market. In such an instance a deconcentration order would be too drastic a deterrent to economic growth ;5s therefore, the Community merely supervises this enterprise and intervenes only if it abuses its dominant position by protecting itself from effective competition in a substantial part of the market. The Community may recommend that this enterprise desist from practices incompatible with the aims of the Treaty, and, in case of noncompliance, the Community may set the modalities of sales and production which must be followed by the defaulting enterprise. 59 If the enterprise continues to disobey, pecuniary sanctions are imposed.
60
Although the anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions are directed exclusively to privately-owned enterprises, the Treaty also imposes certain limitations upon the Member States. Articles 4(d) and 5 (2) oblige them "to assure the establishment, the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of competition." By implication, compulsory cartel arrangements enacted by 56. See KRIwiEmIcKY 
Transitory Period
By assuring the producers and consumers free and equal access to sources of raw materials and production within the Community, powerful forces of competition are released. 60 These will eliminate throughout the Community those enterprises which, because of their inefficient production methods, financial burdens, unfavorable physical conditions, and location (particularly with regard to raw materials), are least productive and thus unable to compete. Initially, however, the suddenly unleashed and unrestricted forces of competition would bring havoc to these weaker enterprises, and cause grave disturbances within the economic system. A gradual organization, offering to the weaker enterprises a breathing spell, assures a much smoother and less harm- ful transition. To accomplish this, the Treaty provides for a five-to sevenyear period of adjustment, 0 7 during which the Community, in cooperation with the Member States, will financially assist 0s and grant temporary protection 69 to the weaker coal and steel enterprises.
70
Financial assistance will aid beleaguered enterprises in specializing their production, modernizing their methods, or otherwise modifying their activities, 71 even to the extent of creating new ones outside the coal and steel industries.
7 2 The enterprises which are forced to close are given preference in establishing new industries. Before granting such financial assistance, the Community must find the proposed project economically sound and capable of providing employment for the released miners and steel workers. If these adjustments cause unemployment, the Community contributes to the employee's unemployment compensation. 73 The released workers will also receive financial assistance for their re-training and transfer to new industries.
In addition to this financial assistance, the Community, may grant temporary protection, in the transitory period only, to coal mines whose operation costs are too high to meet the immediate impact of competition (e.g., Belgian and some French mines). 74 The subsidy fund is raised by imposing a levy upon the most efficient and productive mines.
7 5 Temporary protection is also assured to weaker steel enterprises by restricting steel movements from one region to another, or by fixing minimum prices and production quotas. To adapt the coal and steel industries to the demand of an enlirged, common, and competitive market with a minimum of economic disturbance and loss, is a formidable task requiring, above all, constant cooperation and guid-67. CoNzvi rioN § 1 (4). duties for the protection of its steel industry, with the understanding that these duties will be reduced annually, and completely eliminated by the end of the transition peried.
68.
ance . 7 In all probability, uncontrolled forces of competition would not only fail to establish such a market without ruinous effects, but also fail to check powerful coal and steel enterprises, seldom void of monopolistic tendencies,7 8 in their quick expansion into the newly opened market. This stresses the necessity for a supranational institution with independent powers.
POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY
To maintain the common, competitive market, the Community is granted extensive powers over the activities of the coal and steel enterprises. It thus replaces the Member States' sovereign powers over those industries. 1 9 Exceptionally, the Community may also control enterprises outside coal and steel if they are part of a forbidden economic concentration within these industries, 80 as well as those which systematically discriminate and interfere with the operation of the free coal and steel market. 8 ' To assess properly the extent of the supranational character of the Community, it seems advisable to present first a general survey of all the Community's powers, leaving aside for the moment their distribution among its individual organs.
Power to Request Information: A permanent flow of information is necessary for efficient discharge of the Community's wide range of functions. The Community is empowered to request pertinent information from any coal or steel enterprise directly, 8 2 and, if necessary, to have the information verified on the spot by Community officials. 83 Moreover, the Community may consult with various associations of producers, consumers, workers, and distributors in the coal and steel industries. [Vol, 63.:1 penses, this "fiscal income" is designated for use as unemployment compensation to workers released because of the introduction of new production methods. These funds will also secure their re-employment by financing conversion of the weaker enterprises. The Community will also use the funds to finance technological improvements which will lower production costs, and to support research in production, consumption, and labor safety. 8 0 The amount of fiscal income may be too small to meet the capital investment needs of the coal and steel enterprises. Consequently, the Community is authorized to obtain additional funds, either by borrowing or by guaranteeing loans secured by individual enterprises. 8 7 In addition, the Community has the power to direct the flow of investment to its most productive use. The prevailing lack of capital investment in Europe on one hand, 83 and the large amount of financial outlay needed by the coal and steel enterprises on the other, 8 9 necessitate a coordination of investment policies in order to prevent waste of Europe's scarce capital on projects relatively unimportant for the economic stability of the Conmmunity.0" To avoid such waste, any program of a coal and steel enterprise must, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54, be submitted to the Community for approval. The Community's disapproval of the investment plan bars the enterprise from access to any capital except its own funds. 91 Thus the enterprises are greatly dependent upon the economic policy of the Community which, guided by the over-all market situation, regulates and directs the flow of capital, integrating the entire area into one single coal and steel unit.
Power over Prices: Financial powers alone would hardly be adequate to correct the impaired conditions of competition unless accompanied by some control over prices in the common market. To achieve price stabilization which would protect consumer, producer, and worker alike, the Community has the power to determine price limits on commercial transactions made by the coal and steel enterprises. 2 
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price increase caused by relative scarcity or exploitation by producers, the Community may fix maximum prices for coal and steel products. Similarly, to guard essential enterprises against economic crises which might eliminate them, the Community is authorized to set a minimum price level. By fixing minimum or maximum export prices, 93 the Community may regulate coal and steel exports to meet the competition of foreign sources and the demands of foreign markets.0 4 The Community's control over export prices might, in view of the haziness of the anti-cartel provision on export cartels, be an appropriate and powerful weapon for combating such cartels.5
Powers over Production, Trade, and Consumption: Production control is the greatest power the Community has at its disposal. Because of its drastic nature and far-reaching effects upon most of the industries within the Member States, this power can be invoked only in economic situations of utmost gravity which cannot be remedied by any other means.
9 0 Only a severe decline in demand and the reduced production resulting therefrom give the Community the power to regulate production of coal or steel enterprises. 7 To cope with the general effects of declining demand, the Community may establish production quotas and introduce quantitative import restrictions against products from abroad. 98 These restrictive measures are not introduced to maintain a price level-a motive so common to cartel practices-but rather in order to redistribute the decreased demand and temporary production setbacks throughout the Community. 9 Conversely, it may be necessary to minimize the production disturbances created by a serious shortage of products. In this situation, the Community may establish consumption priorities, allocate natural resources, and impose export restrictions in order to assure an adequate supply and distribution of raw materials and products within the Community.
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Powers over Wages: The improvement of living and working conditions of the labor force in coal and steel is one of the fundamental objectives of the Community.' 0x To achieve this goal, the Community has the power to deal with an enterprise whose success is not attributable to its economic efficiency, but rather to its relatively low wage level in comparison with average wages in that region. The Community may require either the enterprise or the Member State to remedy this existing wage discrepancy. visions, the Community may, after having determined the illegality of such a concentration, order the separation of enterprises or assets illegally merged, and, if necessary, order their forced sale. 10 Against a Member State violating its Treaty commitments, the Community may engage in discriminatory economic practices otherwise forbidden, thus temporarily excluding such a State from the benefits of the common market.11'3 Minimum Community intervention is the underlying principle of the Treaty.'" 7 Free competition assured, the Community. except for controlling and checking monopolistic tendencies and economic concentration, merely supervises the operation of the common market in an advisory capacity. With the appearance of an economic crisis, the Community's powers are enhanced and it intervenes to restore normal and free competition within the market. Although the Community's important powers over production and prices are reserved for abnormal economic conditions and thus appear as strictly emergency powers, it would be erroneous to consider the Community weak. Since the coal and steel industries are frequently afflicted by such conditions, the Community will have ample opportunity to exercise these powers.
regional competitors. The Treaty-"neither authorizes nor provides for positive pl1icy f,,r the improvement of wages." Roux, The Position of Labour under the Selzun:au Plan, 55 INT'L LAB. REv. 316 (1952) . When it does intervene, the Community directs its decision or recommendation to the party-enterprise or State-which fixed the wage level 103. The Treaty imposes sanctions, for example, under Art. 47, ' 3 (failure to provide information) ; Art. 50(3) (failure to pay tax levies) ; Art. 54, f1 (unauthorized investment) ; Art. 64 (price discrimination) ; Art. 5S(4) (violation of production quotas) ; Art. 59(7) (violation of measures taken to alleviate shortages of raw materials) ; iArt. 65(5) (cartels); Art. 66(6) (economic concentration). It distinguishes between fines (des amendes) which are imposed for past violations committed by the enterprise, and daily penalty payments (des astreintes) which are imposed to deter future violations. See, e.g., Art. 47, 113.
One commentator has interpreted too narrowly the scope of the "sanctions" at the disposal of the Community. KRAIaLicKY, op. Cit 
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Institutional Structure
The institutional structure of the Community, designed to represent and protect the interests likely to be affected by the Community's operation, consists of the High Authority, the main organ of the Community; the Consultative Committee, encompassing the special interests of producers, consumers, workers and distributors; the Common Assembly, representing the peoples of the Community; the Council of Ministers, representing the Member States; and the Court of Justice.
The High Autharity administers as well as legislates the policies of the common market.' 0 8 It comprises nine members, who are nationals of the Member States and serve a six-year term of office.' 00 A member of the Authority is responsible to the Community alone,') enjoys immunity from any legal action based upon 'his official acts,"' and is thus independent of his govern- 110. The members "shall exercise their function in complete independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any Government or from any organiation. They will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions." TREATY Art. 9, 5 (emphasis added). They are disqualified from "any business or professional activities, paid or unpaid [and cannot] acquire or hold, directly or indirectly, any interest in any business related to coal and steel during their term of office or for a period of three years thereafter." Id. Art. 9, ff 7.
111. PROTOcOLArt. 11. 112. The Community's Court of Justice has the exclusive power, on petition by the Council or Authority, to remove a member who no longer fulfills the necessary qualifications, or has committed a "gross fault." TREATY Art. 12, 2.
Because of the Authority's extensive powers, the appointment of its members is of considerable importance to the Member States. For the first si:-year term the States appointed eight members by unanimous agreement, leaving the ninth to be chosen by the eight.
11 3 In future elections, however, the State control is somewhat decreased by requiring only a five-sixth's majority." 4 But even under this majority rule, the Member State retains a right to veto the election of any member of the High Authority, whether such member was elected by all the other States or by the eight members of the High Authority.
1 3 An explicit veto-and not a mere negative vote-defeats this member's election. Since an unlimited use of such a veto would enable a Member State to block the election of the High Authority's members indefinitely, the Treaty limits a State's peremptory vetoes to four candidates. Every additional veto may, upon another State's appeal, be reviewed by the Court of justice, which is authorized to declare the veto null and void if it finds an "abusive" exercise of the veto power.1
7
The Consultative Committee is composed of an equal number of representatives from the associations of producers, consumers, workers, and distributors in the coal and steel industries, and secures their cooperation with the Authority.llS Despite the consultative function of this Committee, the Member States have retained the right to designate the eligible organizations of producers' and workers' associations, and allocate seats among them; these associations are merely entitled to prepare a list of their candidates. The Committee is also designed as a safeguard for the interests of the special groups against any arbitrary acts of the Authority. The Authority is obliged to notify the Committee of contemplated actions concerning investment regulation or enforcement of anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions ;1'' a proposed policy is thus subject to public scrutiny. Under this procedure, the High Authority sounds out the opinion and reaction of the interest groups to be affected, and may modify its course of action in order to assure their adequate support. Although subordinate in its position, the Committee is thus indirectly associated with the policy of the Authority.
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The Common Assembly is a representative body for the peoples of the Member States.
1 25 The delegates from each Member State, who are either directly elected by the people or appointed by the State's parliament from among its membership, are spokesmen of their people rather than of their governments.1 2 6The distribution of seats among the Member States reflects their population rather than production potential. 127 Except for the Assembly's right to approve the annual report of the High Authority and possibly effect its resignation, the Assembly serves primarily as a deliberating forum in which the Authority's policies may be examined.
The Council of Ministers 128 is a body of six, each representing one of the Member States. The Treaty explicitly requires that each Member State be shortages of materials, Art. 59(1), (5), (6) ; price practices, Art. 60(1), (2) ; price levels, Art. 61, 1f 1; subsidies, Art. 62; wage levels, Art. 68(2) ; and on any action not expressly provided for in the Treaty, Art. 95, U 1.
The requirement that the Authority must consult with the Consultative Committee distinguishes the status of this Committee from that of the non-governmental organizations "ac- tion of special interest groups, as well as of the public interests of the Member States. An analysis along the traditional lines of separation of powers would not convey a meaningful picture 184 of the complex power structure of the Community. The powers of the Community are partly supranational, and partly a merger of supranational and State powers wielded in a joint decision-making process in which the Authority and the Council of Ministers, representing the Community and States respectively, participate. Since no precise line can be drawn, a functional description of various bodies and their powers is preferable.
Supranational Powers
The Community's supranational powers are exercised by the High Authority.
13 5 A direct link exists between the coal and steel enterprises and the Authority, whose decisions or recommendations are binding upon them without any intermediary assistance of the States. 18 0 When the Authority addresses a Member State, the enterprises are bound indirectly through the State's commitment to implement the Authority's acts. In addition to the binding decisions and recommendations, the Treaty provides the Authority with a third course of action: the opinion. These three methods enable the Authority to deal with the wide variety of economic problems in the most effective manner.
7
Decisions ' 3 are the most far-reaching acts which the Authority has at its disposal. A decision not only determines the ends an enterprise must pursue, but also prescribes the specific means for attaining them. For example, the Authority, in order to meet a raw material shortage, may decide on specific production programs for an enterprise. Recommendations, on the other hand, although binding as to objectives, leave the choice of appropriate means to the enterprise or State. Thus the Authority may recommend to a steel mill dominating a substantial part of the market that it engage in such business practices as would ensure the maintenance of free competition.' 40 The enterprise's disregard for such a recommendation empowers the Authority to make a decision which may set prices or 134. For conditions of sale or establish production or delivery schedules. 141 To abstain from dictating specific administrative or legislative actions, the Authority may address Member States in the form of a recommendation.
1 ' Under Article 73, for example, the Authority may issue corrective recommendations to a State whose quantitative import or export controls have an unduly restrictive effect on the competition within the Community's coal and steel market.
Opinions lack any binding force, and are issued by the Authority, usually by request, for the guidance of the Member States or the coal and steel enterprises.
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Under its supranational powers, the Authority may secure and verify necessary information,'" set the Community's tax policy, 14 ' regulate investment, 46 and determine domestic and export price levels-maximum and minimum-for coal and steel produced within the Community 47 Similarly, the Authority may regulate the wage levels which undesirably affect competition in coal and steel, 148 and establish conditions of sales to prevent or correct discriminatory trade practices by enterprises or buyers in coal and steel.
14 The Authority has exclusive power to impose sanctions for violations of the Treaty or decisions thereunder.
The imposition of sanctions without assurance of their execution would be of little practical value. The Authority, which lacks enforcement powers, must rely on the cooperation which the Member States are obliged to provide. 15 
Limited Supranational Powers
For acts other than those mentioned, particularly for emergency measures, the Authority needs the concurrence of the Council of Ministers.' 5 The difficulty of foreseeing future emergency situations in the Treaty itself and the danger of an arbitrary recognition by one body, partly explain the requirement that both the Authority and the Council concur on the existence of a situation warranting the application of certain emergency measures. 1 6 Besides this, the Council's concurrence introduces a method of control by the Member States, the extent of which depends on the Council's voting procedure. The requirements of an absolute majority, two-thirds majority, or unanimity of the Council indicate the gradations of a single State's control. Generally, a State has greater control when considerable repercussions on, and interference with, its coal and steel industries and other sectors of its economy are expected to result from the Authority's act.
Absolute Majority. The voting procedure of the six-minister Council takes into account the coal and steel production capacities of the Member States. The required absolute majority is attained only if a Member State "which produces at least twenty percent of the total value of coal and steel produced in the Community" sides with the majority. 15 7 This qualification means that either France or Germany must concur with the majority and that against their joint stand the Authority cannot act; their negative vote in effect constitutes a veto. And, if France and Germany both approve the Authority's action, the Council's concurrence may be considered as given, even if the Council's vote was an evenly divided deadlock. If, after a second deliberation, the Authority upholds its original proposal, such proposal becomes an official act of the Community. 5 8 To meet a menacing decline of demand or a scarcity of coal and steel, the Authority may, with the Council's absolute majority, institute production quotas, 59 export restrictions,°0 and, under certain conditions, quantitative import restrictions. 16 ' Even under normal conditions, the Authority needs the Council's concurrence, given by absolute majority, for such actions likely 155. The Authority is committed to consult with the Council of Ministers in specific circumstances. TREATYArts. 50(2) ; 51(1) ; 53,1 12(a) ; 59(6); 60(1) ; 61; 62; 66(l), (4); 67(2), (3) ; 68(5) ; 73, 112; and CONENTON § § 11, 26(1), 29(2). Since the Authority is not bound by the Council's opinion, and may act as it sees fit, this requirement to consult is not an impairment of the Authority's supranational powers. (2), (3). The Authority may limit imports of coal and steel only if the low price of these products resulted from "competitive" practices which the Treaty would not condone within the Community; or when, during a period of declining demand, increased imports of coal and steel would further depress an already low production level within the Community.
[Vol. 63:1I to affect a State's general economy. For instance, the Council's concurrence is required if the Authority decides to finance new industrial activities outside coal and steel in order to provide employment for workers released from coal and steel industries as a result of new techniques and equipment introduced in these industries.
1 6 2 An absolute majority of the Council is also needed when the Authority is dealing with such fundamental aspects of economic policy as determination of types of transactions which will be exempted from the prior authorization required by the deconcentration provisions.
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Two-Thirds Majority. If a two-thirds majority vote is prescribed by the Treaty, the votes are not "weighted" according to production capacity, and a combined stand of France and Germany can be outvoted."" Since this concurring two-thirds majority vote of the Council is required for matters not directly related to production-e.g., the imposition of sanctions against a delinquent Member State, 1 5 or the increase in tax levies beyond the usual rate of one percent' 6 --there is no reason to consider production capacity. A twothirds majority requirement which does not grant France and Germany a privileged voting position is easier to obtain than an absolute majority with its privileged voting. On the other hand, if the Council is deadlocked, its concurrence may be easier to obtain under an absolute majority rule; if France and Germany are on the approving side, the concurrence is considered as given. 167 Under a two-thirds majority rule, however, the Authority's action would have been defeated. Yet, a two-thirds majority presently requires no more votes than an absolute majority, since the present number of ministers on the Council is six.
Unanimity. It is understandable that the unanimous concurrence of the Council 10s is reserved for any act which is bound to change not only the existing structure of the coal and steel industries, but also radically affect a
Id.Art.56,12(b) ; COxVENTIO § §23(3), (8).
163. TEaT o Art.66(3). 164. This interpretation is based on the fact that the Treaty explicitly "weights" the votes of France and Germany on issues requiring an absolute majority, but makes no mention of a privileged voting position for these countries on issues requiring a two-thirds majority. However, some commentators hold that the votes are "weighted" in both instances, and that the Treaty's silence is a mere oversight. State's general economy. The grant or guarantee of loans by the Authority for construction which will increase production or lower its cost, and thus affect the future development of the coal or steel industry, is an example of an act which requires the Council's unanimous concurrence.
1 00
The strong position of the Council is perhaps best illustrated by Article 95. The Treaty could not foresee and deal with all possible future situations which will require Authority action in order to effectuate the Community's aims. In all such instances for which the Treaty makes no explicit provision, the Authority will be able to act only if the Council concurs unanimously.
0
Unanimous Opposition of the Council. Presumably, the Authority may rescind and terminate most decisions or programs which it previously put into effect. But some measures cannot be so easily abolished. For example, the Council may block the termination of a program of production quotas either by unanimous opposition if the proposal to terminate originated with the Authority, or by simple majority if it came from a Member State.
11 ' Similarly, the Authority may not abolish raw material allocation systems if the Council unanimously opposes termination.
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State Powers Preserved: Council's Exclusive Competence
The States have reserved the exclusive power to change the fundamental institutional structure and powers of the Community, and formulate its foreign economic policy. A unanimous Council may set foreign economic policy, 1 8 reduce the number of members on the High Authority, 1 4 increase the number of judges on the Court, 175 broaden the powers of the Community, 11 0 and admit new Member StatesY.
7 7 Of all the Community's powers of intervention, raw material allocation and consumption priorities affect the Member States' economies most vitally. For this reason, in times of serious shortage, a unanimous Council may establish coal and steel consumption priorities, allocate available raw materials among the Community's coal and steel enterprises, and regulate their exports. 178 The High Authority implements the Council's decision and assigns manufacturing programs to individual coal and steel enterprises. [Vol. 63: 1
Failure to Act
As a rule, in matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, the Authority and the Council cannot undertake each other's functions, for such a delegation of power would change the Community's institutional pattern and distribution of power. For example, the Council can never perform any of the Authority's supranational functions such as investigating enterprises, approving investment plans, or imposing sanctions. But the Council may discharge certain functions which are within the limited supranational powers of the Authority, if the Authority has failed to act. Thus, at the proposal of a State, a unanimous Council may request the Authority to take the necessary measures to establish production quotas,' 80 
Amendment Powers of the Community
The operation of the Community will, in all probability, reveal shortcomings in the Treaty which will require amendments. For that purpose, a tvothirds majority of the Council of 'Ministers may convoke a Conference of all governments.
8 188. "If, following the expiration of the transition period provided for by the Convention containing the transitional provisions, unforeseen difficulties which are brought out by the experience in the means of application of the present Treaty, or a profound change in the economic or technical conditions which effects the common coal and steel market directly, munity nor its power structure may be changed by this so-called "small revision." Initiated by a joint proposal of a majority of the Authority and a twothirds majority of the Council, the amendment is then examined by the Court which determines whether or not the substantive and procedural requirements of a "small revision" have been followed. If the Court finds the proposed amendment proper, it becomes effective when approved by a three-fourths majority of the Common Assembly.
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SAFEGUARDS
The considerable powers conferred upon the Community call for effective safeguards against their abuse. Certain safeguards are inherent in the peculiar institutional structure of the Community: the prescribed cooperation between the Council and the Authority; the Authority's compulsory consultation with the Consultative Committee; and the Assembly's supervision over the Authority's general policy.') 0 The Assembly is the weakest safeguard. Reviewing the Authority's report in its annual session the Assembly may, by its censure and two-thirds vote of no confidence, effect the resignation of all members of the High Authority. 191 Although the Assembly may also meet in extraordinary sessions, either upon the request of a majority of its members or of the Authority, 92 its right of censure is confined to its regular annual meeting. 193 As the Assembly cannot appoint members to the High Authority, there is nothing which could prevent the Member States from reappointing the same members who were forced to resign.1'" At present the Assembly is primarily a sounding board-a function indicated by the right of the Assembly or any of its members to submit, at any time, questions to the Authority, and have them answered.' 9 5 Since the Assembly's deliberation can, at best, only influence the future course of the Authority's actions, effective and immediate protection against specific recommendations and decisions of the Authority must be sought in the Court of Justice. '° whose main function is to "ensure the rule of law in the interpretation and application of the present Treaty and of its implementing regulations."' 07 Too unique to lend itself to any traditional classification, the Court's jurisdiction will be described in terms of the following functions :10s (a) review and annulment of the acts of the various Community organs ;109 (b) review and modification of these acts on their merits, and adjudication of tort claims ;00 (c) settlement of disputes between Member States." 0 '
Review and Annulment of Acts
Jurisdiction to review and annul acts of the Community's organs is the Court's most significant function.
2 02 An appeal for annulment purports to remove as promptly as possible an allegedly deficient act which is either injurious to some interests or contrary to the Treaty's objectives. A party's appeal is 19& In addition to the three functions subsequently discussed in detail, the Court has disciplinary jurisdiction over the members of the Authority: "Mtembers who no longer fulfill the conditions necessary to the exercise of their functions or who have committed a gross fault may be removed from office by the Court on petition by the High Authority or CounciL" TarAT Art. 12, 1 2. An appeal for review and annulment may be based on any one of four grounds of alleged deficiency: legal incompetence, substantial procedural violation, violation of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and misapplication of power.
20 4 Hypothetical acts of the Authority will serve as illustrations of these four types of legal deficiencies. If the Authority, which lacks the necessary powers, determines the Community's foreign economic policy, the act would be deficient on the ground of legal incompetence. And the Authority grossly violates the procedure if it fails to consult the Consultative Commiittee, as prescribed, or secure the necessary Council's concurrence. It violates the Treaty itself, for example, if it imposes sanctions upon enterprises which did not engage in any illegal business practices. Finally, an appeal based on "misapplication of power" attacks an act which the Community's organ had the power to undertake but which was done in this instance for purposes other than those declared by the Treaty. For example, the Authority misapplies its granted power to regulate investment, if its motive for disallowing an investment project was to stifle competition within the Community.
Despite the common grounds, the extent of the right to appeal differs with the appellant as well as with the nature and origin of the acts challenged. The right of enterprises and associations in the coal and steel industries to appeal is limited to acts of the High Authority specifically addressed to them and affecting their interests. 20 3 Although these and other private parties cannot attack the acts of the Assembly or Council, 20 this limited appeal is an important means of checking the Authority's supranational powers which are applied against business activities. Thus a buyer may appeal an act of the Authority [Vol. 63 :1 which, because of his systematic violation of conditions of sales, deprived him of access to the Community's coal and steel market. 2 -7 Similarly, coal or steel enterprises and associations may contest a ruling which declares their practices illegal under the Community's anti-cartel provisions.
-" 0 A MKember State's right of appeal is broader than that of private parties. It may not only dispute the validity of any act of the Authority which is general and addressed to the entire Community, whether or not the State's interests are specifically involved, -0 9 but it may also challenge the acts of the Assembly or the Council on the grounds of legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation.
210 Although many acts of the Authority require the Council's concurrence, the Treaty is silent on whether or not a State may also challenge the validity of such a concurrence. Since the Treaty does not explicitly grant an appeal, it may be assumed that a State will be unable to challenge a concurrence. But the Council's concurrence is such an important institutional safeguard that a State's right of appeal should be sustained.
In addition to a right of appeal which is directed solely against the acts of the Community's organs, a State may also challenge another State's action. This appeal is available in the event that a State vetoes more than four candidates for the High Authority.
2 11 Since the veto is not an act of a Community organ, none of the four grounds of legal deficiencies are applicable, and the appeal must be based, instead, on the ground that the exercise of the veto was "abusive."
To assure the proper administration of the Community within the framework of the Treaty, the Authority and the Council may challenge each other's acts. The Council's right of appeal is broader than that of the Authority. While the Council may appeal the Authority's acts on any of the four grounds of legal deficiency, 2 the Authority's challenge of the Council's acts is limited to allegations of legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation.
21 3 The
Council's lack of responsibility to the Community for any misapplication of power or violation of the Treaty may seem striking and dangerous. However, since the Community was created by the Member States, it may also be changed by their mutual agreement which is expressed in the Council's unanimous action. m214 On the other hand, the Authority, and not the Council, may contest the Assembly's acts on the grounds of legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation. 215 The Assembly is the only Community institution which is denied a right of appeal.
Eligible parties may seek Court redress if their interests are injured by the failure of the Authority to act. To prevent damage resulting from inaction, enterprises and associations in coal and steel, as well as a State or the Council, may bring to the attention of the Authority its failure to take decisions or recommendations which are either required by the Treaty (e.g., breaking up illegal economic concentration) or within the Authority's discretion (e.g., establishing maximum or minimum price levels) if the failure to exercise its discretion constitutes a misapplication of power. 21 0 If the Authority then fails to act, such an implicit negative decision is, after two months, a ground for appeal to the Court. 217 The Court will determine whether or not the request for the Authority's action was justified; and if so, the Authority will be required to act.
2 15 The Treaty makes no provision in the event that the Authority disregards the Court's judgment. It may be assumed, however, that at least the coal and steel enterprises injured by such inaction, would have a claim for damages.
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The alleged legal deficiency of an act preconditions the extent of the Court's review. To determine legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation, it suffices for the Court merely to investigate the law pertinent to the procedure followed or the powers granted, without going into the merits of the act or evaluating the facts on which the act was based. 220 But this limited investigation would be inadequate when the act is challenged as a misinterpretation of the Treaty or its implementing rules, or as a misapplication of power. In such instances, the Treaty empowers the Court to examine the facts underlying the act. 221 And, since misapplication of power refers to "an administrative act which, though within the legal competence of the agent, is in reality done for another purpose than that which the law authorizing it had 215. TREATY Art. 38, 111 1, 3. The lack of appeal by the Council does not constitute a restraint on the Member States, since a State may appeal an act of the Assembly. Ibid. The Authority's right of appeal will be particularly important when the Assembly attempts to censure the Authority's annual report, and effect the resignation of the Authority's members. See p. 26 supra. Art. 35, %ff 1, 2. 217. Id., 1f 3. 218 . The requirement that the Authority take action after the Court's adverse judgment is an implicit conclusion from Art. 35, which states that there can be an appeal from the original failure to act. If the right of appeal is to have any meaning, it must be assumed that the organs of the Community are required to heed the decision of the appellate body, In practice, it will be difficult to make a sharp distinction between a Court review which is limited to the applicable law, and one which inquires into the facts as well. Even an appeal based upon legal incompetence will force the Court to examine certain pertinent facts, although it must not inquire into motives. The complexity of this problem is apparent, for instance, when the Court deals with an appeal challenging the competence of the Authority on the ground that economic conditions did not legally warrant the Authority's act. This might be the case when the Authority, on the basis of declining demand, introduces a system of production quotas.2 -4 To determine whether or not a decline of demand actually existed will require the Court's extensive examination of the facts. It is evident that such an examination comes very dose to, and perhaps is even undistinguishable from, both an evaluation of facts and a review on the merits of the Authority's act,2-a review to which the Court is theoretically entitled only in case of misapplication of power or misinterpretation of the Treaty.
TREATY
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Review of Acts on the Merits and Adjudication of Tort Claims (Plenary, Jitrisdiction)
In addition to its jurisdiction on appeals for annulment of acts, the Court has jurisdiction to examine the economic expediency and necessity of the Authority's acts, and, if it desires, to modify these acts.2I Tis plenary jurisdiction permits an unlimited evaluation of the economic situation; the Court decides on the merit of the act itself, and thus controls, to a large extent, the economic policy of the Community. 229. In addition to the issues subsequently discussed in the text, the Court has plenary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of private or public contracts concluded with, or on behalf of, the Community, if the contracting parties agree to submit the controversy to the Court. TanTY-Art. 42. High Authority; (2) directly injured by the operation of the Community; or (3) penalized by the Authority's sanctions.
Damages Caused by an Official Act: The appeal for review and annulment is an immediate remedy to prevent further injurious effects of the act contested. Besides mere annulment, there is the necessity to grant a recovery for damages already inflicted before the act was invalidated. The requirements for claiming damages are more difficult to satisfy than those for annulment. The Community's limited income and the difficulties in ascertaining the extent of damages, based by and large on the speculation as to what the situation might have been had the deficient act not been undertaken, justify the limitations on the Community's liability. 23 0 According to Article 34, only coal and steel enterprises may claim damages caused by a deficient recommendation or decision of the Authority. However, this claim seems, at least implicitly, to be available to any person or enterprise affected by a deconcentration measure ordered by the Authority. 21 Thus, for example, an American corporation, owning enterprises within the Community which are affected by an illegal deconcentration order, may claim damages for the injury which it suffers as a result of that order.
The necessity of establishing the illegal nature of the Authority's act indicates that the enterprise's claim must in any case be preceeded or accompanied by the Court's annulment. 23 2 The enterprises will recover damages only if the injury was caused by an illegal official act of the Authority which implies a "fault for which the Community is liable," and which injures the enterprises directly and particularly.
23 3 The Treaty does not define the meaning of such a "fault," leaving its definition and elaboration to the Court. It may be assumed, however, that only seriously deficient acts-e.g., involving misapplication of power-will justify a claim for damages. In determining whether or not the nature of the damage resulting from such a "fault" is "direct," the Court will, in all probability, maintain that the damage must stand in a direct causal connection with the illegal act. This causal connection is evident when the loss resulted from illegally imposed fines or, in the case of a buyer, from illegal exclusion from the Community's coal market. The requirement of a "particular" damage precludes any Community liability for acts which cause general injury to many enterprises. The aggrieved enterprise must show that its losses were "unique" and not similarly suffered by others as a result of the Community's operations.
If the Court finds that the act is not only illegal, but also involves a fault and damages as indicated above, the High Authority will be obliged to give effect to the Court's annulment by granting equitable redress, primarily in 230. RAPPORT is liable not only for damages caused by an illegal official act of the High Authority, but also for damages which result from a defective performance of the Community's administrative service.2 7 The liabilities for official acts and defective administration are mutually exclusive, precluding any double recovery on tort claims. 2 38 The Community's liability for administrative deficiency covers injuries resulting from negligence on the part of the Community's officials. This liability covers actions which are merely coincidental to the operation of the Community and which lack any attributes of an official act. For example, violations of business secrecy 230 by a Community official gives rise to a claim based on administrative deficiency. While the Community's liability for official acts usually entitles only coal or steel participants 240 to claim damages caused by an illegal recommendation or decision of the Authority, the right to recover for injuries caused by an administrative deficiency is open to anyone who suffers them. 241 For example, the tortious operation of a car owned by the Community would give the injured pedestrian a claim based upon administrative deficiency. Since the injury was not caused by an official act, there is no occasion for a preliminary annulment procedure, and the injured party proceeds directly to the Court for an adjudication of his tort claim.
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The liability of the Community for administrative deficiency may be secondary to the personal liability of the Community official if the injury results from his personal fault while performing his official function. 24 responsible official. 244 The Treaty does not elaborate on the distinction between these two liabilities. In French administrative law, 2 40 the difference between an impersonal, anonymous administrative fault and a personal fault for which the official is responsible is sometimes very subtle.
2 40 The gravity of the official's personal fault appears to be a criterion for determining the nature of the liability. Thus the tortious conduct of an intoxicated driver of an official car will certainly be classified as a personal fault. On the other hand, liability would rest with the Community, if it was negligent in employing an official whose incompetence caused the injury. The dividing line between the individual responsibility of the official and that of the Community will depend considerably upon the Court's policy as to the extent of Community liability.
Sanctions: The imposition of sanctions is within the discretion of the High Authority. To minimize the danger of arbitrary actions, the Treaty provides that, before imposing sanctions upon violating enterprises or individuals involved in an illegal economic concentration, the Authority must give these parties a hearing. 247 Furthermore, in order to afford the opportunity of an early appeal, the procedure is divided into two parts. First, the Authority determines in a preliminary decision the existence of a violation and the sanctions to be imposed should the enterprise or individual at fault continue to disobey the Treaty's provisions. Within one month after this preliminary decision, an appeal may be brought to the Court. The Court's examination of this preliminary decision is unlimited, and it may remove or reduce the sanctions imposed.
2 48 However, if the aggrieved party fails in its appeal or, without attempting to appeal, disregards the Authority's preliminary decision, the Authority may then order the execution of the sanctions already imposed. Against such a decision, the party has only an appeal for annulment on any of the four grounds of legal deficiency, 24 which theoretically precludes any consideration of the sanctions on their merits. Anyone who will be directly affected may appeal to the Court's plenary jurisdiction against the Authority's preliminary decision declaring an economic concentration illegal and ordering deconcentration.5 0 In deciding on appeal whether or not the concentration is illegal, the Court will enter into an unlimited economic evaluation of the facts which were the basis of this order, and consider the deconcentration order on its merits. The Member State is similarly granted an appeal against the determination and imposition of sanctions. 25 2 If the Authority finds that a Member State has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, it will make its findings in a preliminary decision, and grant the State reasonable time for compliance. The State may contest the preliminary decision by appealing to the plenary jurisdiction of the Court which, evaluating all the circumstances, ,ill examine the decision on its merits. If the State fails in its appeal, or, without seeking an appeal, continues to disregard the Authority's decision requesting the fulfilment of the State's obligations, the Authority may, with a two-thirds majority concurrence by the Council, suspend payments due to the delinquent State or resort to economic discrimination. But even against this second decision, the State has a right of appeal to the Court for a consideration on the merits. This gradual pressure put upon the State has several advantages. First, it gives the State an opportunity to recognize and correct its default, thus avoiding hasty punishment which may evoke equally hasty reactions and endanger the stability of the Community. Second, a Court confirmation of the Authority's preliminary decision may not only influence the Council to grant the concurrence required for the Authority's sanctions, but also persuade the violating State to rectify its default and comply with the Authority's decision.
2 5 3
Disturbances in a Member State's Economy:
The far-reaching powers of the Court are best illustrated by its unlimited jurisdiction over a Member State's appeal against any action or inaction of the Authority, which, in the State's opinion, provokes fundamental and persistent disturbances in its general economy. 254 The State must first call the existence of such a situation to the Authority's attention. If the Authority refuses to recognize it or fails to take the necessary corrective measures, the State may appeal to the Court, which will render a complete judgment on the merits of the situation. Instead of examining the legality of the act, the Court considers the expediency of the Authority's position25 by evaluating this position in light of all the essential economic facts. 
CONCLUSION: DANGERS AND PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY
The reaction of big industrialists, trade unions, and ultra-nationalistic political parties reflects the far-reaching effects the Community may have upon the existing structure of the coal and steel industries. The vigor of these assaults cannot but caution against their acceptance at face value, and calls, therefore, for their critical analysis and confrontation with the professed aims of the Community.
The Community is frequently accused of being nothing more than an international super-cartel. 260 The Community's institutional structure, particularly the High Authority's mandatory consultation with the Consultative Committee, 2 6 ' its public operation, [Vol. 63: 1 which established a steel cartel in France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg, suffices to disclose the latter's disregard for maintaining free competition and reducing steel prices, and its indifference to the problems of labor. Moreover, the 1926 Agreement did not purport to secure raw materials, exchange technical experience, or facilitate investment.
2 5 On every issue, the Schuman Plan compares most favorably, showing a firm resolution to serve the entire Community instead of a limited group and its special interests. The nature of this resolution could not be better illustrated than by the statement of M. Jean Monnet, the actual framer of the Plan, asserting that "there can be no Schuman Plan that will raise the living standards if cartels are permitted." Critics have objected to the Community's economic regime as introducing a planned economy.
-26 7 The pooling of the Member States' sovereign powers over coal and steel, however, is necessary to create and maintain the common, competitive market. Mere elimination of trade barriers and lenient enforcement of inadequate national legislation regulating international cartels could hardly assure such an objective. 26 s M[oreover, steel industries of European countries have practically never been competitive.2 9 "With the establishment of the High Authority, international power has now been substituted for the power of national governments, and public power for that of private cartels. '270 In situations which might endanger the common market the Community intervenes to deter coal and steel enterprises from engaging in restrictive business practises which undermine free competition. The Community can be described as a liberal economic system with a modicum of mild, restrained control that is particularly essential at the initial stages of development. 27 It "represents quite an original combination of liberalism and planning. We might say that it provides for a controlled system of free competi- "It is not our task to direct the production of coal and steel. That is the role of industry. Our task is to establish and maintain conditions under which production will develop to the best advantage of the common interest." MONNET, SPEECHES DEunEn BY PrX.ESIDT OF THE HIGH AUTHORrTY 12 (1952).
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Finally, the Plan is frequently objected to on the ground of possible German domination of the Community. German domination is a danger resulting from the dependence of the French steel industry on imports of German coke, 2 7 3 and from the powerful production potential of German heavy industry. However, the quantity of raw material necessary for producing steel might be reduced by such new production methods as electric furnaces.
2 74 It is difficult, therefore, to predict with certainty that French dependence on imported coke is bound to establish German predominance. Of course, the Community will fail entirely in its task if it allows German coal and steel industries to use their natural advantage to destroy the competitive market.
Dangers of the Institutional Structure
The novelty of the Plan and its possible far-reaching effects on national self-interests have prompted the Member States to reserve considerable governmental control in the Community's operation. This explains the present pattern of the Community's supranational structure-a structure still primitive in some respects.
Aside from its vote of censure, the Assembly is presently denied the right of initiative, of appeal against the Council's or High Authority's acts, or of making appointments to the Court or Authority. Even budgetary control is removed from its competence. Furthermore, the lack of supranational identification among the Community's population precludes, at present, the Assembly from playing a constructive supranational roley. Eventually the Community, which is endowed with supranational powers, will also have to assume a supranational responsibility for their exercise. Once there is evidence of greater Community solidarity, it would seem that the Assembly should play a more important and responsible part in pursuing the Community's aims. If this is to be attained, the powers of the Council of Ministers, which stands free of any individual or collective responsibility to the Community, must be modified.
2 7 6 The extensive participation of the Council in the work of the High Authority will, in the course of future development, necessitate the demand for some degree of Council responsibility to the Assembly.
Ultimately the Community is still dependent upon the willingness of States to cooperate. Even the most ingenious supranational institutional structure could not, at least in the beginning, dispense with the States' assistance. The High Authority's supranational powers are primarily applied against enterprises rather than States, and if the States abuse their extensive, and perhaps disproportionate, reserved power, the Community may fail. Whether or not 273 [Vol. 63 : 1 these powers will be abused depends on the constellation of political forces in the States. 277 The operation of the Community would be aggravated by a considerably strengthened Social Democratic Part3 in Germany, 27 8 and seriously jeopardized by an increased Communist following in France 2 -0 or Italy. = Y 9 Since the States are the supporting pillars for the Community's supranational structure, lack of State support or determined disruptive efforts would wreck the Community and revive the national autarchy of the coal and steel industry.
It may be assumed, however, that this danger would diminish with the increasingly successful operation of the Community, and that the advancing integration of national coal and steel industries into one single economic area would gradually strengthen the Community. The working together and reaping of common benefit might substantially relax the nationalistic tension between the French and German people, and also decrease the dangers of a State arbitrarily wrecking the Community. Once the benefits of the common market are experienced by the consumer, producer and worker alike, they will show a growing confidence in the Community, be more and more inclined to seek protection and redress with the Community, and would very likely throw their popular support behind it. A general success scored by the Community in its initial years of operation would forcibly demonstrate the advantages of a supranational institution, which in the long run stands better equipped to deal with matters common to all people.
Such a favorable development would be strengthened by the unifying impact which the Community may have on the existing political, economic, and legal systems of the Member States. Since the Court of Justice infringes upon a State's monopoly of judicial power, 2 8 ' constitutional amendments may be necessary. 28 2 Disparate tax systems of the States will be particularly affected. If a relative equality of competition is to be established, gross disparities -8 must eventually be eliminated. No less consequential, particularly for the trade unions, is the standard set forth by the Treaty for the producers associations. In discharging its functions, the Authority may not only consult the Consultative Committee, but also individual producers' associations. To qualify for such a consultative status, a producers' association must "give a satisfactory place in [its] organization to the expression of the workers' and consumers' interests." 28 4 The extent of the Community's impact on a State's legal system is too complex to be dealt with here in detail. Attention may be called to the effects inherent in enforcing the deconcentration and anti-discriminatory provisions of the Treaty, which seriously affect the freedom of contract principle enunciated in the laws of the Member States. 285 Similar impact is to be expected if the deconcentration provisions conflict with the acquisition of new economic power under a State's marital and inheritance laws. 280 Because the Community lacks its own law, other than in the Treaty, the Court will be faced with a "conflicts" problem on the choice of the proper substantive law. It is inconceivable that in adjudicating legal disputes to which the Community is a party (e.g., credit transactions and employment contracts) the Court would attempt to apply the diverse laws of the Member States. Inequality would be introduced if, for example, the amount of damages recoverable against the Community were dependent upon the situs of the tort. The need for certain unification is evident, and the Court might frequently find it necessary to formulate common principles to supplement or supersede the specific laws of the Member States.
The possibilities mentioned are, of course, hardly more than a conjecture of an anticipated unification process, whose precise trend and extent can be ascertained only by the actual implementation of the Treaty itself. the significance of the choice of persons called to serve on the main bodies of the Community in general, and on the High Authority and Court in particular. Their political and economic outlook will substantially influence the Community's future policy, and the molding of its economic system.2 -3 The judges on the Court will certainly perform a unique function of creating a supranational case law applicable throughout the Community.
The Coal and Steel Community in the Free World
Politically and economically, the Community is an organic part of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and its future can be properly viewed only within this broader framework. The effects of the Community's operation, transcending its political frontiers, will affect the world's coal and steel trade. The Schuman Plan is the pioneer in the movement to consolidate Western Europe. It may be followed by the still unratified treaty establishing the European Defence Community, and the proposed European agricultural, 3 0° health, 301 and transportation authorities. 0 2 However desirable the aim, a single approach to the problem is not devoid of pitfalls. First, these proposed authorities suffer from an almost servile imitation of the Community's institutional structure, which is conditioned by the peculiarities of heavy industry. 30 Second, the artificial dissection of organic economic ties into separate economic organizations under independent authorities endangers their viability. Their operation without proper coordination could conceivably result in wasted effort. This development can be curbed only by a single authority which will control the essential segments of the European economy. The establishment of this single authority is still very remote, and will partly depend upon the success of the Schuman Plan experiment. The draft of a European Political Community 0 4 is a beginning in this direction. The European Coal and Steel Community is a new and necessary experiment which seeks to foster peace and democracy. The ultimate choice is between a democratic, united Europe-created by free men through the demo-cratic process and dedicated to the worth and dignity of the individual-and the grave possibility of an enslaved Europe under the dictate and force of the Soviets.
"Peace depends essentially on the creation of conditions which, though they may not change the nature of men, will direct their conduct towards each other into peaceful channels. That will be one of the main consequences of the transformation of Europe with which our Community is concerned.... In building up Europe, the Europeans are laying the very foundations of Peace." ' 5
